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AIR FRANCE V. SAKS: AN ACCIDENTAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States adhered to the Warsaw Convention1 in 1934,
United States courts have struggled to construe the proper interpreta-
tion of the Convention's most innovative provision-limited airline lia-
bility for passenger injuries occurring from "accidents" 2 during inter-
national air travel.3 In attempting to carve out the boundaries of the
"accident" precept, courts have been at odds in formulating a uniform
definition.4 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court attempted to allay
this confusion by developing a new standard based on the ordinary
meaning of the term.5 The Supreme Court, however, overlooked the
unique meaning that the term "accident" engenders in the context of
airline liability. In doing so, the Court set a standard that circumvents
United States obligations under the Warsaw Convention.
This Comment analyzes the meaning of the term "accident" under
article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Part I discusses the historical
background of the Convention as modified in part by the Montreal
Agreement. Part II examines judicial attempts to define the term "ac-
cident" under article 17. Finally, Part III scrutinizes the courts' analy-
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The official text of the Warsaw
Convention is in the French language. This Comment uses the United States' transla-
tion, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982).
This Comment uses the terms "convention" and "treaty" interchangeably. The term
"treaty" now is accepted as a generic term that embraces all kinds of international
arrangements in written form. T. EuAs, THE MODERN LAW oF TREATIES 14 (1974).
2. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17. The text of article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the air-
craft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (defining scope of international
air transportation for purposes of the Warsaw Convention). The Warsaw Convention
comprehends transportation where the place of departure and the place of destination
are within the territories of two parties to the Convention or within the territory of one
party if there is a stopping place in another territory. Id.
4. See infra notes 48-89 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretations
of the term "accident").
5. Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (1985) (construing the term "acci-
dent" used in article 17 of the Warsaw Convention from its ordinary meaning).
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ses and proposes a more technically definitive standard for determining
when an "accident" occurred for Warsaw Convention purposes.
I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention is the principal treaty governing air carrier
liability in international air transportation.' Anticipating the growth of
air transportation,7 and aiming to facilitate the rapid expansion in in-
ternational commercial operations,8 many nations united to formulate a
uniform body of regulation. The Warsaw Convention was the result of
two international air conferences. 9 In concluding the Warsaw Conven-
tion in 1929, air strategists achieved two primary objectives: to provide
a uniform system of regulation in a manner that would accommodate
many countries with different legal systems;' 0 and to limit airline liabil-
6. See 2 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW (A)17-25 (4th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as 2 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT] (listing the more than 120
countries adhering to the Warsaw Convention). See also G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as G. MILLER] (discussing
primary role of Warsaw Convention in regulating international air transportation); A.
LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 4.1 (2d ed. 1981) (noting that the Warsaw Convention
is the most widely adopted of all treaties after the United Nations Charter).
7. The airplane became a viable means of transportation in the late 1920's, pro-
foundly affecting industrialized society. Charles A. Lindbergh's flight across the Atlan-
tic Ocean in 1927 ushered in an era of widespread international air transportation. See
generally C. LINDBERGH, THE SPIRIT OF ST. LouIs (1953) (relating Lindbergh's own
story of transatlantic flight); S. ALTSHUL & M. BENDER, THE CHOSEN INSTRUMENT
(1982) (unfolding complete history of Pan American Airways, Inc., the first American
international airline).
8. See A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 2.1 (2d ed. 1981) (stating that airline
operations in domestic and foreign travel totalled only 400 million passenger-miles be-
tween 1925-1929). In contrast, in 1985 alone, scheduled international and domestic air
traffic was estimated at 168 billion tonne-kilometres. 1985 Scheduled Air Traffic
Growth Continued, but at Lower Annual Rate, 42 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION (ICAO) BULL. 10 (Feb. 1986).
9. See 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW VII(I) (4th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter cited as 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT] (tracing history of Warsaw Con-
vention). The First International Conference of Private Air Law, held in Paris in 1925,
adopted a resolution creating an International Technical Committee of Aerial Experts.
Id. (In French, Comit6 Internationale Technique d'Experts Juridiques A6riens
(CITEJA)). The committee was formed to study problems connected with private lia-
bility in the international operation of aircraft and to codify the law in this area. Id.
The Second International Conference on Private Air Law reconvened in 1929 in War-
saw as a result of the CITEJA studies and deliberations and adopted the committee
proposal thereby establishing the Warsaw Convention. Id. See generally Ide, The His-
tory and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal
Experts (C.!.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. AIR L. & COM. 27 (1932) (discussing development of
Warsaw Convention); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld & Mendel-
sohn] (providing detailed historical analysis of Warsaw Convention).
10. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at preamble (recognizing specifically
the advantage of uniformity in regulating international air transportation). See also
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ity in order to protect the newly emerging and vulnerable airline indus-
try from disabling losses.' The Warsaw Convention is a body of rules
that provide a uniform framework for governing the legal rights and
responsibilities of international air carriers, passengers, and shippers.12
Moreover, the Convention provides a uniform system for documenting
passenger tickets, baggage checks, and air-way bills.13 These items
form the contractual relationship between the carrier and passenger or
shipper.1 4 Fixing the rights and liabilities of the carrier and the passen-
gers, the Convention helps alleviate confusion and conflict of laws
uncertainties.15
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing one purpose of Warsaw
Convention as establishing world-wide liability rules to govern international aviation
that would supersede differing local laws); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (recognizing Warsaw Convention goal to
create uniformity in actions arising from international air accidents); Burnett v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (D.N.M. 1973) (stating Warsaw dele-
gates recognized that international air transport would "link nations of vastly diverse
cultural and legal systems" and anticipated uniformity through a controlling body of
law). See generally Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REV. 423 (1945) (discuss-
ing Warsaw Convention purpose as effecting a uniformity of procedure and remedies).
11. See SENATE CONMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CER-
TAIN RULES, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934). Considering the
Warsaw Convention liability limitation, Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated:
It is believed that the principle of limitation will not only be beneficial to passen-
gers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of recovery and as tending to
lessen litigation, but that it will prove to be an aid in the development of interna-
tional air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more definite
and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the probable result
that there would eventually be a reduction of operating expenses for the carrier
and advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of reduced transportation
charges.
Id.; see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 499 (noting that the liability
limitation was intended to encourage the growth of the infant airline industry by assist-
ing airlines to "attract capital that might otherwise be scared away by the fear of a
single catastrophic accident").
12. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at preamble. (discussing the advantage
of uniformity); see also Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 396,
314 N.E.2d 848, 854 (1974) (stating "[t]he apparent purpose of the entire Convention
is uniformity among its diverse adherent Nations-the achievement, so far as possible,
of a uniform body of law as to the various subject matters which are covered").
13. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 3-16 (providing elaborate rules
that regulate travel documents).
14. Id.; see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 33 (referring to consen-
tual nature of contract for transportation); Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21
N.Y.2d 160, 166-67, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17-18, 234 N.E.2d 199, 201, cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1039 (1967) (discussing the Convention's emphasis on the instruments as evidence
of a contract that settles, in advance, the application of the Warsaw Convention).
15. See 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, supra note 9, at 1(89) (relating that
the Warsaw Convention eliminated many conflict of law questions that would otherwise
arise); Matte, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the US. Senate, 8 ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 151, 153 (1983) (stating that "[t]he most important reason for
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The Warsaw Convention, however, receives its notoriety for placing
an absolute limit on air carrier liability for passenger injury and
death. 16 Article 17 presumes carrier liability for passenger injuries17
caused by an "accident" occurring during air travel."3 Accordingly,
once a plaintiff passenger shows that an "accident" occurred, the bur-
den of proof shifts from the passenger to the carrier. To avoid liability,
the carrier must demonstrate that it acted without negligence. 19 In ex-
change for this presumption, the Convention limits the carrier's liabil-
ity to the passenger. 20 Currently, under the Warsaw Convention, the
ceiling for air carrier liability is approximately $8,300.21
achieving uniformity was to avoid serious and complicated conflict of law problems
which could arise in the absence of a treaty").
16. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 17, 22. Article 17 establishes liabil-
ity for personal injury and death. Article 22 limits the carrier's liability. Id.
17. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17. The presumption, however, does
not guarantee the injured plaintiff full recovery of the limited amount. A claimant can
recover only the amount of damages proven not exceeding the liability ceiling; see Hus-
serl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. (Husserl I), 351 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (predicating recovery under the War-
saw Convention on proof not only of an accident, but damages as well). But see War-
saw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25 (permitting a claimant to pierce the liability
ceiling under the Convention by proving that the carrier is guilty of wilful misconduct
and recover proven damages in excess of the liability limit).
18. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17. The negotiating history of the
Warsaw Convention reveals that article 17 was the subject of extensive debate. The
Paris Conference specified that "[t]he- carrier is liable for accidents, breakdowns, and
delays." [1925 Paris] Conference Internationale de Droit Priv6 A6rien 87 (1936), cited
in Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (1985). The Warsaw Conference, how-
ever, considered the revised draft that CITEJA submitted:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained during carriage:
(a) in the case of death, wounding, or any other bodily injury suffered by a
traveler;
(b) in the case of destruction, loss, or damage to goods or baggage;
(c) in the case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods or baggage.
International Conference on Air Law Affecting Questions, Minutes, Second Interna-
tional Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Oct. 4-12, 1929, Warsaw 264-65 (R.
Homer & D. Legrez trans. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Minutes].
19. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17 (relieving plaintiff of the bur-
den of proving negligence).
Presumptive liability is particularly helpful for plaintiffs in aviation tort cases be-
cause the expense and expertise required to prove negligence is often beyond the grasp
of the injured victim. See B. Reukema, No New Deal on Liability Limits for Interna-
tional Flights, 18 INT'L LAW. 983, 994 (1984) (discussing plaintiff's difficult burden in
proving airline negligence).
20. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22 (limiting airline liability for
personal injury or death in international transportation to 125,000 Poincar6 francs per
person).
21. Id.; see Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir.
1967) (computing that 125,000 Poincar6 francs converts into $8,291.87 U.S. dollars);
see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1780
(1984) (holding that the official price of gold would continue to be used as unit to
convert liability limits into U.S. dollars). But see infra notes 33, 38, and accompanying
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The Convention also mitigates the harshness of the presumption of
liability, allowing air carriers to assert certain defenses. First, the Con-
vention permits airlines to rebut the presumption of liability with a due
care defense.22 An airline thus escapes liability by proving that it took
reasonable measures to avoid the damage or that to take such measures
was impossible.23 Second, the Convention permits air carriers to avoid
liability when the passenger's contributory negligence was a cause of
the injury.2 Third, the airline may claim that the suit was not timely
filed and that the Convention's two year limitation therefore bars the
claim.25
A. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION
The United States, although an observer, was not an official party to
the international air conferences that formulated the Convention.20 De-
siring to take advantage of the uniform scheme, however, the United
States adhered27 to the treaty in 1934.28 Currently, the Warsaw Con-
text (discussing Protocols and Agreements that amend or modify the Warsaw Conven-
tion's recovery limits).
22. Warsaw Convention, supra note I, at art. 20(l). Article 20(1), the due care
defense, provides: "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his servants
and agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was im-
possible for them to take such measures." Id.
23. Id.
24. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 21 (providing that the air carrier
may be excused wholly or partly from liability when a passenger is contributorily
negligent).
25. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 29 (providing that action under the
Warsaw Convention must be brought within a two-year time period); see Oliver v.
Scandinavian Airlines System, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,283 (D. Md. 1983) (finding pas-
senger's claim time barred under Warsaw Convention); Falcones v. Lan-Chile Airlines,
13 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,366 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (extinguishing passenger's claim not filed
within Warsaw Convention limitation period); Bapes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8
Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,354 (N.D. I1. 1962) (dismissing wrongful death claim not filed
within the article 29 time limitation); Finkelstein v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 15 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 17,379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (finding negligence suit brought more than
two years after claim arose was time barred under Warsaw Convention).
26. See Minutes, supra note 18, at 10 (recognizing United States negotiators as
official observers).
27. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 38. Article 38 permits nations that
were not parties to its formation to adopt the Warsaw Convention. Article 38 provides:
(1) This Convention shall, after it has come into force, remain open for adher-
ence by any state.
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Poland, which shall inform the Government of each of
-the High Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the notifica-
tion made to the Government of the Republic of Poland.
Id.
The United States adhered to the Convention subject to a reservation that the first
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vention preempts domestic law29 governing liability in international air
transportation"0 because its treaty status makes it the supreme law in
the United States.3'
Since its adherence, however, the United States expressed dissatis-
faction with the Convention's low ceiling on air carrier liability.3 2 After
paragraph of article 2 of the Convention should not apply to international transporta-
tion performed directly by the state. 78 CONG. REC. 11,582 (1934).
28. See 78 CONG. REc. 11,577 (1934) (Senate approving resolution of ratification
supporting adherence to Warsaw Convention by voice vote without floor debate).
On July 31, 1934 the United States deposited its adherence instrument to the War-
saw Convention in the Poland Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives as directed by arti-
cle 37 of the treaty. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 502. The Warsaw
Convention was proclaimed effective for the United States on October 29, 1934. Id.
29. Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1977). Under domestic
law, a carrier's liability for passenger injury or death generally is determined by princi-
ples of negligence. Id. Negligence claims brought under domestic aviation law often are
aided by the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, permitting an inference of
negligence on the part of the carrier. W. KEATON, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 242-47 (5th ed. 1984). Because American tort law holds the tortfeasor re-
sponsible for the costs of accidents for which he is at fault, the Convention's ceiling on
the amount of damages recoverable is a diametric departure from American tort prin-
ciples. See 129 CONG. REC. S2246 (daily ed. March 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hol-
lings) (asserting that limited liability under Warsaw Convention destroys compensation
goal of our tort law system).
30. See Chandler v. Jet Air Freight, Inc., 54 Iil. App. 3d 1005, 1008, 370 N.E.2d
95, 98 (1977) (determining international transportation under Warsaw Convention
from contract for carriage, not international in character); Butz v. British Airways, 421
F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that Warsaw Convention provisions exclu-
sively govern rights and liability of parties when contract for carriage provides for
transportation between Warsaw Convention signatories); see also Husserl v. Swiss Air
Transport Co. (Husserl II), 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that
United States' substantive law governs actions that the Warsaw Convention does not
comprehend).
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause); see Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920) (noting that treaties made under United States authority are
binding law that judges in every state must follow); see also Dalton v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (stating Warsaw Convention, an interna-
tional treaty, is supreme law in the United States).
32. The United States began to propose revisions of the air carriers' liability limita-
tion shortly after it adhered to the Warsaw Convention. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 9, at 504 (underlying American concern was whether the limit had been set
at the right level). Early proponents argued to raise the passenger recovery limit be-
cause airlines could obtain low-cost liability insurance. Id. at 502.
Current proponents of modifying the Warsaw Convention liability limit submit addi-
tional arguments. See Note, Aviation:- Liability Limitations for Wrongful Death or
Personal Injury-A Contemporary Analysis of the Warsaw System, 10 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 392, 394 (1984) (noting that the liability limitation under the Convention is
inconsistent with the deregulatory concept that the airline industry is capable of per-
forming without government protection); 129 CONG. REc. S2245 (daily ed. March 7,
1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (asserting strict limit on liability under Warsaw
Convention inhibits adequate accident investigation thereby harming level of air
safety).
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several unavailing attempts to adequately increase the liability limit,33
the United States submitted a notice on November 15, 1965 threaten-
ing denunciation of the Convention. The notice made clear, however,
that the United States desired to remain a part of the cooperative War-
saw system. 5 Before the United States could carry out its threat, a
33. See, e.g., Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28,
1955, art. XI, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140, reprinted in A.
LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 955, 958 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Hague Protocol] (doubling liability limit to approximately $16,600); Protocol to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, done March 8, 1981, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971), art. VIII
(1971) (entered into force March 8, 1981), reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION
LAW 975, 978 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Guatemala City Proto-
col] (increasing liability limit to approximately $100,000); Additional Protocol No. 3 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, signed at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929, as Amended by the Protocols
Done at the Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, and at Guatemala City on Mar. 8, 1971, signed
at Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975, art. II, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW
985, 985 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Protocol No. 3]
(raising maximum recovery limit to approximately $120,000 with $200,000 domestic
supplemental compensation plan).
The United States has not ratified any of these Protocols. The Senate refused to
consent to the Hague Pr6tocol in stalled proceedings, insisting that a S16,000 liability
limit was still too low. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 504-16 (provid-
ing detailed history of Hague Protocol ratification controversy). The modified liability
limit under the Guatemala City Protocol also failed to appease the United States. See
Comment, Aviation Law: Attempts to Circumvent the Limitations of Liability Im-
posed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw Convention, 54 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 851,
854 (suggesting United States failure to ratify Guatemala Protocol due to inadequacy
of $100,000 limitation and successful lobbying by air carriers). Most recently, the Sen-
ate rejected the modified liability scheme under the Montreal Protocols. 129 CONG.
REc. S2270 (daily ed. March 8, 1983) (failing to achieve a two-thirds majority vote for
Senate treaty consent in a 50-42 vote).
The only other variance of the Warsaw Convention is the Guadalajara Convention.
Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air Performed by a Person Other
Than the Contracting Carrier, signed Sept. 18, 1961, ICAO Doc. No. 8181, 500
U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force May 1, 1964). This Convention does not modify the
liability limitations, rather it clarifies the position of successive carriers.
34. Department of State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 923-25
(1965). According to the Warsaw Convention, actual denunciation becomes effective
six months after a country gives such notice. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art.
39.
35. Department of State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 923 (1965).
The notice acknowledges:
To this end, the United States of America stands ready to participate in the
negotiation of a revision of the Warsaw Convention which would provide sub-
stantially higher limits, or of a convention covering the other matters contained
in the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol but without the limits of
liability for personal injury or death.
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number of airlines voluntarily agreed to recast the liability scheme3"
pursuant to a provision in the Warsaw Convention that specifically stip-
ulates that airlines may contract to increase the liability limit.37 The
contractual arrangements under this provision developed into the Mon-
treal Agreement. 8
B. THE MONTREAL AGREEMENT
The Montreal Agreement is a contractual variance of the Warsaw
Convention. Undersigned by airlines with departures, arrivals, or con-
nections in the United States, 9 the Agreement neither directly involves
the member nations, 40 nor amends the Warsaw Convention. 4 Function-
ally, however, airlines that participate in the Montreal Agreement ac-
cept two major variances in the Warsaw Convention scheme of liabil-
ity: (1) carriers concede liability up to a $75,000 ceiling, including
legal fees and costs;4 2 and (2) carriers relinquish the due care defense
available under the Convention.'3
36. Id. The Proviso in the Denunciation Notice envisioned a provisional arrange-
ment among principal international airlines to establish a higher liability limit. Id. Re-
sponding to the threat, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) held a
conference in Montreal in 1966 in order to accommodate the Proviso and maintain
United States participation in the Warsaw Convention. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 9, at 552.
37. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22(1) (providing that "by special
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability").
38. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AGREEMENT No. 18900, AGREEMENT RELATING
TO LIABILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL
(1966), approved by CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ORDER No. E-23680, reprinted in
31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement].
39. See id. (describing the Montreal Agreement as including all international
transportation which, according to the passenger ticket, includes a point in the United
States as a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed stopping place); see also 48
Fed. Reg. 8048 (1983) (adopting rule by Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) requiring all
carriers with direct United States contact to adhere to the Montreal Agreement).
The CAB is now defunct. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(3) (1982). Under the Airline Deregu-
lation Act of 1978, the Department of Transportation, in consultation with the Depart-
ment of State, now exercises power formerly possessed by the CAB over federal avia-
tion and foreign air transportation. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
504, 94 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
40. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 38 (noting that unlike other modifications
of the Warsaw Convention, air carriers signed the Montreal Agreement rather than
member nations); see also 2 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, supra note 6, at (D)45-
49 (listing air carriers participating in the Montreal Agreement).
41. See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1259 n.6
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (stressing Montreal Agreement is not a
treaty, but an agreement among airlines).
42. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 38 (noting that when legal fees and costs
are awarded separately, the liability limit adjusts to $58,000 under the Montreal
Agreement).
43. Id.; see also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing due care
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Eliminating the due care defense, the Montreal Agreement, in effect
imposes an absolute liability system upon participating airlines for inju-
ries occurring from "accidents" in international air travel." The
Agreement, however, only modifies the scheme of liability; it does not
affect other provisions of the Warsaw Convention. The prerequisite
contained in article 17 that an "accident" occur continues to trigger
airline liability.4 5 Thus, the airline faces absolute liability for all inju-
ries incurred due to "accidents" in connection with a flight unless the
passenger is at fault46 or the claim arises after the two year statute of
limitations.17 The modified liability scheme under the Montreal Agree-
ment consequently prompted court consideration of the "accident"
question.
II. INTERNATIONAL AIR ACCIDENTS: ARTICLE 17 AND
UNITED STATES COURTS
The Warsaw Convention predicates airline liability to passengers
upon the occurrence of an "accident."'48 The Warsaw Convention, how-
ever, does not define the term "accident." Courts, therefore, must inter-
pret article 17 to determine the meaning of the term as an element of
liability.49 Since the air carriers' adoption of the Montreal Agreement,
defense available to air carriers under Warsaw Convention).
44. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing absolute liability
under Montreal Agreement); Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d
1256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (finding that the Montreal Agree-
ment imposes absolute liability on air carriers).
45. See G. MILLER, supra note 6, at 109 (noting that while Montreal Agreement
established absolute liability, it did not directly alter terms of article 17).
46. Williams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 442 F. Supp. 455, 457 (E.D. La. 1977) (re-
taining the air carriers' contributory negligence defense under the Montreal Agree-
ment). This defense was maintained because of fear that higher limits, coupled with
absolute liability would encourage sabotage. Montreal Agreement, supra note 38, at
para. 1 (stating specifically that the Agreement will not affect the rights and liabilities
of the carrier with regard to "any claim brought by, on behalf of, or in respect of any
person who has wilfully caused damage which resulted in death, wounding, or other
bodily injury of a passenger").
47. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (Warsaw Convention imposing two-
year statute of limitations on any action brought under its terms).
48. See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1404 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding
that the threshold requirement for liability under the Warsaw Convention is establish-
ing that an accident has occurred under article 17); Lautore v. United Airlines, Inc., 16
Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,944, 17,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing case because plaintiff
conceded there had been no "accident" within meaning of article 17).
49. Another condition article 17 requires is that accidents take place while the pas-
senger is physically on board the aircraft, or when entering or alighting from the air-
craft. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17 (mandating liability for acci-
dents "on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking").
1986]
AM. U.J. INT7L L. & POL'Y
courts experience the particular challenge to interpret the meaning of
article 17's "accident" in conjunction with the Agreement's liability
modification. 50 Courts advanced differing views of the "accident" issue
until ultimately, the Supreme Court provided the definition in Air
France v. Saks.
A. EARLY VIEW: ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
During the Convention's formative years, most cases brought under
the Warsaw Convention involved airplane crashes or disappearances."'
Although avoiding a critical analysis of the term, courts listed these
occurrences as "accidents."5 2
After the United States completed the Montreal Agreement, a to-
tally new scheme of liability emerged, and the interpretation of the ac-
cident prerequisite increased in importance." Courts quickly expanded
the breadth of the term "accident" to include hijackings54 and terrorist
Courts have struggled to construe this condition as well; see Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975) (developing a tripartite test based on
passenger's activity, location, and control to determine that article 17 covered terrorist
attack at departure gate); Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d
1256, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (adopting totality of sur-
rounding circumstances test to determine questions of embarking or disembarking).
50. See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying text (discussing court disparity inter-
preting "accident" resulting from differing perspectives of the absolute liability
standard).
51. See, e.g., Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(crashing plane); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (crashing plane); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 223
(S.D. Cal. 1964) (disappearing aircraft).
52. See Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 369 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 965 (1968); Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that airplane crashes were clearly accidents
under article 17).
53. See G. MILLER, supra note 6, at 109-10 (noting significance of determining
conditions sufficient to hold air carrier liable subsequent to adoption of Montreal
Agreement):
[The Montreal Agreement] changes the whole outlook of the liability regime
since the carriers that are party to it have agreed to raise the liability limit to
$75,000 and more importantly, . . . to waive their right to use Article 20(1) of
the Convention which allows them to avoid liability if they prove that they have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to
take such measures. Thus, the carrier is in effect subject to a regime of strict
liability and it is essential to determine the conditions in which damage must
occur before the carrier can be made responsible for it.
Id.
54. See Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Gilberto, 74 II1. 2d 90, 101, 383
N.E.2d 977, 980, (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979) (finding airplane hijack-
ings during international flights encompassed by article 17 accident meaning);
Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 975 (S.D.N.Y.
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attacks, 55 characterizing the airline's liability in these instances as ab-
solute.5 6 During this period, however, courts continually failed to care-
fully consider the meaning and scope of the "accident" limitation .
Courts frequently relied on policy considerations to justify decisions.
In the court's perspective, passenger protection was among the primary
goals of the Warsaw Convention."" Persuaded by the prospects of
quicker settlements and unhampered accident investigations, courts
were confident that the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Mon-
treal Agreement, now compelled an absolute liability standard to better
effectuate passenger protection.59
1977) (holding planned and deliberate hijackings are article 17 accidents); Krystal v.
British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322, 1333 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (hijacking
was an "accident" within article 17 meaning); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.
(Husserl I), 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a.'d per curtam, 485 F.2d 1240
(2d Cir. 1973) (finding hijackings within "accident" ambit).
55. See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.
1977) (en banc) (holding terrorist attack is an article 17 accident); Day v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976)
(holding air carrier liable under article 17 for terrorist attack on passengers waiting to
board aircraft). But see In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 155 (D.P.R. 1975), afd,
Martinez Hernandez v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 545 F.2d 270, 282 (Ist Cir.
1976) (holding terrorist attack occurring in baggage claim area not an accident).
56. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir. 1977). Although the Convention
creates a presumption in favor of the plaintiff, the liability scheme remains based on
fault. Under the Montreal Agreement, however, the airline, without the due care de-
fense, is strictly liable for "accidents." See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977)
(finding Montreal Agreement imposed absolute liability on air carriers); Day v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976)
(acknowledging Montreal Agreement absolute liability effect).
57. See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. (Husserl 1), 351 F. Supp. 702, 706-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court in Husserl I first addressed the hijacking question. After
noting that hijackings were an unanticipated gap in the Warsaw Convention liability
scheme, the court focused on the Montreal Agreement absolute liability system to pro-
vide guidance on the issue. Id. The Agreement was attentive to the problem of inten-
tional acts of sabotage and addressed it by shielding saboteurs from recovery under the
Warsaw system. Id. The court inferred, however, that airlines should be liable for inno-
cent victims of such occurrences. Id. The court did not directly address the "accident"
question. Courts extended this reasoning to terrorist attacks, and again skirted the "ac-
cident" issue. The emphasis in the terrorist attack cases focused on the embarking/
disembarking question, rather than the "accident" issue. See supra notes 49, 55 (dis-
cussing terrorist attacks).
58. See Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (concluding that passenger protection is a primary goal of
the Warsaw Convention).
59. Id. Courts reasoned that because the Convention functions to redistribute the
costs involved in international air transportation, the carrier is in the best position to
bear the burden of accident costs. Courts found that the airlines' adoption of absolute
liability under the Montreal Agreement justified this result. Id.
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B. ENCOUNTERING TURBULENCE
Applying an absolute liability standard, however, presented compli-
cations when courts faced unusual factual situations, such as passenger
injuries on routine international flights not caused by abnormal occur-
rences.60 These unusual injuries included hearing losses caused by nor-
mal cabin depressurization, and hernia and heart attacks occurring
during the proper functioning of the aircraft. Earlier, courts had little
trouble construing "accidents" from such events as airplane crashes,"'
severe turbulence,62 hijackings, 68 terrorist attacks,6 4 and accidental
falls.615 When presented with injuries occurring during normal flight op-
erations, however, courts were forced to look deeper into the meaning
and limitation of the "accident" prerequisite.
The court in Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,66 was the first
court confronted with this quandary.67 After noting that the Montreal
Agreement established an absolute liability standard without altering
other provisions of the Convention, the court determined that all the
prior cases recognizing accidents shared a common characteristic-an
unusual, unanticipated incident as the immediate proximate cause of
the injury. 8 The court, thereby, held that an abnormal happening 9
was the key to determining whether an "accident" occurred and thus
the appropriate standard to determine air carrier absolute liability for
passenger injuries.70
60. See infra text accompanying notes 65-88 (presenting unusual factual situations
from which Warsaw Convention "accidents" have been claimed).
61. See supra note 52 (recognizing airplane crashes as "accidents" under Warsaw
Convention).
62. See Weintraub v. Capitol Int'l Airways, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,058 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981) (finding accident when air turbulence caused rapid descent of aircraft
and resulted in passenger's hearing impairment).
63. See supra note 54 (finding hijackings encompassed by Warsaw Convention).
64. See supra note 55 (holding airlines liable for terrorist attacks under Warsaw
Convention).
65. See Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (finding accident when plaintiff fell from doorway after departure gate was re-
moved); Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines System, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,283, 18,284
(D. Md. 1983) (conceding "accident" occurred when intoxicated passenger fell on
plaintiff). But see MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971)
(finding "accident" did not occur when passenger fell in baggage claim area).
66. 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
67. Id. at 401-05.
68. Id. at 410 (noting the lack of external factors that could have induced the in-
jury, the court distinguished MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir.
1971)).
69. Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 413 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
70. Id. (implying that an unusual or unexpected happening engenders the common
meaning of the term "accident"). Other courts have used the common meaning to in-
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Persuaded that an abnormal happening was the appropriate stan-
dard, other courts found that airlines could not be held liable for a
passenger's internal reaction occurring during normal aircraft operation
without an abnormality or malfunction causing the injury. 1 Courts
were not willing to make airlines the insurers of their passenger's
health and to grant recovery under the Warsaw Convention merely be-
cause a plaintiff experienced an unfortunate incident during air
travel.72
In Air France v. Saks, 3 the Ninth Circuit attempted to change the
"accident" standard. In Saks, while the plane was in a routine descent
for landing, a passenger suffered from a hearing loss after experiencing
severe pain and pressure in her left ear.74 The district court applied an
unusual or abnormal occurrence standard and granted summary judg-
ment for Air France.7 5 The aircraft's depressurization system was not
affected by anything unusual or unexpected. The district court, there-
fore, found Air France not liable for damages under the Warsaw
Convention. 6
C. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ABSOLUTE LiADiUTY STANDARD
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the "un-
usual or unexpected happening" standard. Construing the Montreal
terpret article 17 terms. See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402. 1405 (lst Cir.
1971) (using the common meaning to define "disembarking"); Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (using the common meaning to define "embarking").
71. See DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1196 (3d Cir.
1978) (finding equilibrium loss during routine flight not article 17 "accident"); Abram-
son v. Japan Airlines, Co., 739 F.2d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1176 (1985) (finding aggravation of previous injury not "accident" under the Warsaw
Convention).
72. See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 413 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (demonstrating the court's sympathy for the plaintiff's plight, but the court did
not go so far as to provide an actionable cause without some abnormal occurrence).
73. Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1338
(1985).
74. Id. at 1384. As a passenger on an international flight, Saks's suit for damages
was governed by article 17 of the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal
Agreement. Id. Both instruments contractually bind the United States and Air France.
Id.
75. Id. The district court relied on the seminal cases to support summary judgment.
DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1196 (3d Cir. 1978); War-
shaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (apply-
ing unusual occurrence standard and finding that normal repressurization changes do
not incite accidents).
76. Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984).
77. Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1338
(1985).
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Agreement as imposing absolute liability on airlines for all injuries
proximately caused by occurrences during air travel, the court found
that absolute liability attaches under the Montreal Agreement for all
risks inherent in air travel.7 8 Consequently, under the Ninth Circuit's
standard, any occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft
triggers an article 17 "accident. 79 The Ninth Circuit's absolute liabil-
ity standard broadened the scope of the term "accident" thus encom-
passing all incidents connected with air travel.
D. SAKS: UNUSUAL OR UNEXPECTED HAPPENING STANDARD
In Air France v. Saks, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit decision, rejecting that circuit's absolute liability theory.80 The
Court specifically distinguished between the cause and effect of an in-
jury,"1 holding that an accident must be the cause of the injury and not
the injury itself.8 2 Furthermore, the Court surmised that to hold air-
lines absolutely liable for passenger injuries under article 17 requires
some link in the chain of causation between the injury and the unusual
or unexpected event. 8
To support its definition in Saks, the Supreme Court concluded that
the Montreal Agreement did not in fact establish true absolute liabil-
ity." The Court reasoned that although the Montreal Agreement elimi-
nates the due care defense, the Agreement does not expand the scope of
carrier liability to include all risks inherent in air travel.8 5 The Warsaw
Convention continues to apply and therefore requires an "accident"
78. See id. at 1386-87 (reasoning that the Montreal Agreement created a shift
from negligence to absolute liability for all injuries incurred from air "accidents").
79. See id. at 1384 (holding that a malfunction or abnormality was not a prerequi-
site for liability under the Warsaw Convention). The court argued that permitting an
air carrier to assert that a passenger's injury was not caused by an accident would, in
essence, permit the carrier to use the due care defense. An air carrier could not proceed
with this argument, however, because the Montreal Agreement eliminated the due care
defense, imposing absolute liability on airlines. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that
liability would attach to injuries resulting even from normal aircraft operations. Id. at
1384-88.
80. Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
81. Id. at 1342. The Court stressed that "it is the cause of the injury that must
satisfy the definition rather than the occurrence of the injury alone." Id. (emphasis in
original).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1346.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Court noted that the characterization of the Montreal Agreement as
imposing absolute liability is not accurate because liability is absolute only to the ex-
tent that an airline cannot utilize the due care defense. Id. The accident issue involves
analysis of the nature of the event, not the care taken by the airline. Id.
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before absolute liability attaches.86
Subsequent decisions construing "accident" under article 17 focused
on the unexpected and unusual criteria enunciated in Saks. For exam-
ple, one court held that a landing aggravating a neck injury could not
be construed as an "accident" because it was not unusual or unex-
pected as a landing is an anticipated operation of every flight.8" An-
other court held, however, that a bomb threat inducing a miscarriage
was an "accident" under Saks' definition.88 The court reasoned that
the threat was an unexpected and unusual external event outside the
normal operation of the aircraft. Therefore, the miscarriage induced by
the bomb threat was an accident under the Warsaw Convention.80
III. THE WARSAW CONVENTION ACCIDENT STANDARD:
CLEARED FOR LANDING
Because the Warsaw Convention is designed to provide uniform in-
ternational law, courts must interpret the Warsaw Convention consist-
ently. 90 The threat of absolute liability for airline "accidents" under the
Montreal Agreement necessitates formulating a uniform definition of
the term. The Supreme Court in Saks attempted to provide this uni-
form standard, requiring that an unusual or unexpected event cause the
requisite "accident." '91 Although the Supreme Court recognized that
causation is the fundamental element in determining carrier liability,9 2
the unusual or unexpected criteria provides inadequate guidance in the
context of airline liability, and is inconsistent with the purposes and
expectations of the Warsaw Convention. 3 Failing to devise an aircraft-
86. See id. (emphasizing that "until Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention is
changed by the signatories, it cannot be stretched to impose carrier liability for injuries
not caused by accidents1').
87. Salce v. Aer Lingus Airlines, No. 84-3444 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1985); see also
Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1064, 1065 (E.D. 111. 1985) (holding
that a heart attack, not the result of any unexpected or unusual external event con-
nected with a flight, is not an "accident" within article 17 contemplation).
88. Salerno v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
89. Id. at 657.
90. See D. GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND TIlE WARSAW CONVEN-
TION I0 (1937) (stressing text uniformity as well as interpretation uniformity for effec-
tive Warsaw Convention implementation).
91. Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. at 1345.
92. See supra note 81 (Court recognizing causation element in Saks).
93. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1978).
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (stressing that courts should construe the Warsaw
Convention to further its overall purpose and design even if that construction requires
rejecting the literal meaning of a term); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
53, 62, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 254, 203 N.E.2d 640, 643-44 (1964) (stressing that literal
meaning of words should not defeat the purpose and policy of the Warsaw Convention
as a whole).
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connected standard, the Supreme Court undermined the uniformity it
sought to establish. The design of the Warsaw Convention mandates an
aircraft accident.
A. EFFECTUATING THE DESIGN OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The text of the Warsaw Convention and its negotiating history sup-
port a more technical standard for the term "accident" than the Su-
preme Court provided in Saks. The Warsaw Convention provides two
distinct standards for air carrier liability: an "accident" is the threshold
for recovery in article 17 for personal injury or death, whereas an "oc-
currence" is necessary to establish air carrier liability in article 18 for
destruction or loss of baggage.94 Therefore, an "accident" is plainly not
synonymous with an "occurrence." 9 Because "occurrence" is a broader
and more relaxed standard, it follows that "accident" requires more
than an unusual or unexpected happening.
An examination of the terms of various proposals to amend the War-
saw Convention makes this distinction more apparent. The Guatemala
Protocol 6 and the Montreal Protocol No. 47 both amend article 17,
substituting the word "event" for "accident." 98 The Protocols suggest
that the substitution of the word "event" for "accident" expands the
scope of carrier liability under the Warsaw Convention. 9 The amended
94. Compare Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17, with Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 1, at art. 18(1) providing:
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of destruction
or loss of, or of damage to, checked baggage or goods, if the occurrence which
caused the damage so sustained took place during the transportation by air.
Id.
95. Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338, 1342 (1985). The Court stated that the
drafters "otherwise logically would have used the same word in each article." Id.
96. See Guatemala Protocol, supra note 33, at art. IV (substituting word "event"
for "accident").
97. See Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, signed at Warsaw on
Oct. 12, 1929, as amended by the Protocol done at the Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, signed
at Montreal Sept. 25, 1975, art. IV, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 985,
985 (2d ed. Doc. Supp. 1981).
98. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 33, at art. IV. The text of article 17 as
amended provides:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal injury of a
passenger upon condition only that the event which caused the death or injury
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or
injury resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
Id. (emphasis added).
99. See Mankiewicz, Warsaw Convention" The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City,
20 Am. J. CoMP. L. 335, 337 (1972) (noting changes in article 17 intended to establish
strict liability for all events).
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article 17 under the Guatemala Protocol also excludes liability for inju-
ries resulting "solely from the state of health of the passenger."100 The
exemption for the passengers' state of health indicates that the expan-
sion still does not include every injury occurring during a flight, partic-
ularly internal physical reactions.101 Since the United States is not a
party to these Protocols10 2 and thus continues to adhere to the original
Warsaw Convention, courts remain bound to apply the article 17 "acci-
dent" requirement.103
B. SAKS: No FLIGHT PLAN FILED
When considering an article 17 accident under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the proper focus should be on a malfunction or interference in the
operation of an aircraft. By linking an "accident" to aircraft operation,
the carrier will be liable for mishaps happening within the airline's con-
trol of the functioning aircraft. This standard, however, will not create
carrier liability for accidents occurring on board that have no connec-
tion with physical air transportation.04 The Warsaw Convention does
not impose liability for all events connected with international
flights. 10 5 Recovery for damages under article 17 requires more than
travel or an occurrence, it requires an accident.100
A more precise aircraft malfunction standard recognizes that causa-
100. See Guatemala Protocol, supra note 33, at art. IV (providing state of health
exemption).
101. Accord Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984) (Wallace, J..
dissenting) (declining to make air carriers liable for all incidents occurring during
flight).
102. See supra note 33 (discussing United States' failure to ratify Protocols).
103. The judiciary is bound by a recognized principle of international law, pacla
sunt servanda: treaty obligations must be observed. Geofroy v. Riggs. 133 U.S. 258,
270 (1890); see also Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977) (commenting
"'[o]ur duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
whatever they might be, and until one of our sister branches declares otherwise, the
Warsaw Convention remains the supreme law of the land"); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italienne, SPA, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508, 515 (2d Cir.
1966), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968), reh'g denied, 391 U.S.
929 (1968) (Moore, J., dissenting) (stating "judicial predilection for their own views as
to limitation of liability should not prevail over the limitations fixed by the legislative
and executive branches of government. . ."); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1794 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating "as long as
the political branches of our government choose to adhere to the Convention, the courts
of the nation are obliged to enforce it as it was negotiated and written").
104. See M. MILDE, THE PROBLEMS OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE
BY AIR, A STUDY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (Kafka trans. 1963) (claiming
carrier is not liable for damages arising from events not deemed "accidents" in air
traffic, e.g., a heart attack, a cerebral stroke, or a miscarriage during flight).
105. Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984).
106. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17.
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tion is the intrinsic basis for liability. 10 7 Concurrently, the standard dis-
associates itself from negligence to avoid undermining the Montreal
Agreement that eliminated the due care defense. In accordance with
the objectives of both the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Agreement, this aircraft malfunction standard deters drawn out litiga-
tion on the liability issue.108 Moreover, this standard alleviates exten-
sive judicial inquiry, automatically excluding all injuries that occur
during the normal operation of an aircraft and injuries caused by the
peculiar physical conditions of passengers. At the same time, the stan-
dard includes hijackings and terrorist attacks as "accidents" since they
interfere with the scheduled operation of the aircraft.
Courts, including the Supreme Court in Saks, alluded to a more
technical standard, but failed to adequately define its scope or empha-
size its utility.'09 Common sense dictates that linking the definition of
"accident" to the operation of the aircraft, rather than resorting to its
ordinary meaning,"10 best effectuates the intended purpose of the Con-
vention. Furthermore, an aircraft accident standard is consistent with
the context of the Convention as well as the genuine shared expecta-
tions of all the parties to the Convention."'
C. JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
The judiciary's tendency to expand the scope of Warsaw Convention
"accidents" may be due to blurred perceptions of the treaty. Perceiving
inequities in the Convention's low liability limits, 1 2 courts actively at-
tempt to reconstruct these liability provisions to expand the carrier's
107. See Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934) (recogniz-
ing the fundamental distinction between an accident that is the cause of the injury and
an injury that is the accident itself).
108. See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 410 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (emphasizing the United States goal in maintaining its participation in the War-
saw Convention through the Montreal Agreement is the rapid settlement of disputes).
109. See Warsaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 411 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (noting that the easiest way to solve the difficulty would be to limit absolute
liability for aircraft accidents) (emphasis added).
110. See 1 LAW & COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY IN FIVE LANGUAGES 15 (1985) (de-
fining "accident" as "an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event"); I THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 55 (1933) (defining "accident" as "anything that happens with-
out foresight or expectation").
111. See Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 373
U.S. 49 (1963) (stressing that specific words of treaties should be given meaning con-
sistent with genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties).
112. See Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d 406, 412 (2d Cir. 1982); Reed v.
Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977) (acknowledging that unfairness of liability
limitation under the Warsaw Convention should not affect courts' interpretative role).
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liability by broadening the scope of the "accident" prerequisite.' 13
Courts, however, have no authority to alter the Warsaw Convention
through active judicial interpretation.11 Treaty revision is a function
reserved for the political branches.'11 Courts possess an interpretive
role in the treaty process, and can construe a treaty only within the
guidelines established by executive and legislative action. 10
CONCLUSION
The "accident" requirement is pivotal to airline liability under the
Warsaw Convention. In ascertaining whether an "accident" occurred,
courts responded with conflicting interpretations due to the Montreal
Agreement's modified liability scheme. The Supreme Court in Saks ul-
timately defined an article 17 accident as an unusual or unexpected
happening external to the passenger. The history of the Warsaw Con-
vention, however, clearly indicates that the parties did not intend arti-
cle 17 to apply to accidents unrelated to aircraft operations, a result
that is inevitable under the broad terms of the Court's standard. Ac-
cordingly, if the United States intends to be a party to the uniform
system of airline regulation, the Warsaw Convention warrants a more
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